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past is infinitely distant from today. That is, we cannot say that an infi-
nitely many days have elapsed to this point. The past, like the future, is 
only potentially infinite. But though the only meaningful projections of 
the future are finite (any future day is temporally finite from now), that 
does not entail a future terminal event. Similarly, the only meaningful 
projections of the past are finite (any past day is temporally finite from 
now), but that does not entail an initial event. 
But as C&C point out, though this is true if one counts from the present 
to the past, the problem is that one has to "complete" an infinite to get to 
the present if there is no beginning. Rundle's reply that any event-a me-
teor hitting the earth n years ago-is only finitely distant does not address 
the problem of getting to the present where there is no starting point. Run-
dle mistakenly thinks that the problem is epistemic, not ontological. 
For Rundle, without an initial event, nothing comes to be and thus 
nothing needs explanation, for continuing in being is not something that 
requires explanation. Indeed, "since there is no time at which the universe 
might not have existed, it is not possible that the universe should not have 
existed, so it exists of necessity" (p. 183). So in effect, with the necessity of 
the universe we have an end to explanations. The principle of sufficient 
reason is still true; it is just that it does not apply to the universe. The 
universe is a posteriori necessary. So whereas Craig's argument rests on 
the contention that the universe must have had a beginning because there 
can be no actual infinite, Rundle contends that the universe did not have a 
beginning but is not actually infinite either. In effect, he seeks to avoid the 
dilemma with which C&C conclude their book. 
This short summary can only allude to the subtle and dialogical philo-
sophical reasoning found in both books. Since Craig has a penchant for 
engaging his opponents in debate, both in situ and in print, one might 
expect an ensuing volume where the two actually go head to head. The 
interesting question will then concern what kind of dialogue is possible 
between a Wittgensteinian and a realist. 
The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Exis-
tence of God, by John Foster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. ix and 
191. $45 (hardcover). 
GRAHAM OPPY, Monash University 
In this fascinating book, John Foster develops a novel argument for the 
existence of God on the basis of considerations about inductive inference 
and laws of nature. The key claim that Foster defends is this: that regular-
ities in the behaviour of physical objects in different times and places are 
only satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the Judaeo-Christian 
God's causal imposition of regularities qua regularities on the physical 
universe brings it about that the operation of the physical universe is 
partly governed by natural laws. On Foster's account, for there to be a 
law of nature is for there to be a certain type of natural regularity of 
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which it is true that it is nomically necessary that things are regular in 
that way; and for there to be a certain type of natural regularity of which 
it is true that it is nomically necessary that things are regular in that way, 
there must be something that causally imposes this regularity on the uni-
verse qua regularity, i.e., in a way that leaves open all of the details of how 
things conform to that regularity. 
Foster's book begins with some considerations about the justification 
of 'inductive inferences,' e.g., of predictions about the future on the basis 
of past regularities. In the face of the realisation that it is not easy to see 
how inductive inference admits of 'rational justification,' there are vari-
ous responses that philosophers have essayed. Foster discusses: arguments 
from past success-dismissed on the grounds that they are question-beg-
ging; pragmatic justifications-dismissed on the grounds that they do not 
provide rational grounds for belief that past regularities are projectible; 
the claim that inductive inference is constitutive of rationality-dismissed on 
the grounds that this suggestion fails to capture the normative dimension 
of rationality; arguments from a priori principles of probability-dismissed 
on diverse grounds that I shall not attempt to summarize here; and the 
claim that inductive inference is a basic form of sound reasoning whose rational-
ity should just be taken for granted-dismissed on the grounds that there 
are cases in which this assumption counts inferences as rational which 
are, in fact, manifestly irrational. (I think that Foster's dismissal of prag-
matic justifications is too quick; he fails to consider the role that doxastic 
conservatism-and the principle that outlaws negative undermining of 
beliefs-might play in resisting sceptical overtures. More importantly, I 
think that Foster's objection to the claim that inductive inference is basic 
also fails, because the case that he takes to defeat the proposal is crucially 
under-described: once we have information about the probabilities that are 
attributed to, for example, the claims that are assumed to be known, the 
difficulties that Foster claims to detect simply evaporate). 
Next, Foster presents what he takes to be the 'core' of the correct (no-
mological-explanatory) solution to lithe problem of justifying inductive 
inferences." This account has two key aspects. First, it claims that ob-
served regularities justify an inference to the best explanation of the ob-
taining of those regularities, viz., the obtaining of natural laws that nomi-
cally necessitate the obtaining of those regularities. And, second, it claims 
that the prediction of the obtaining of future instances of the regularities 
is now a matter of deductive inference (from the laws, perhaps together 
with information about standing conditions). In order to meet obvious 
prima facie objections to this analysis, Foster insists (at least pro tem) that 
this account only applies to regularities "in the physical world," and not 
to regularities that pertain to human psychology and the like; and he 
also insists (at least pro tem) that this account is not intended to handle 
'probabilistic laws.' As Foster notes, a broadly similar account of laws of 
nature is defended by David Armstrong (and by Michael Tooley and Fred 
Dretske); one chapter of Foster's book is devoted to a very interesting 
critique of Armstrong's views. 
Foster provides detailed responses to two prima facie plausible objec-
tions to the nomological-explanatory solution to lithe problem of justify-
ing inductive inferences." First, in response to the suggestion that there 
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is no reason to suppose that there is anything in the pattern of regulari-
ties-simply in virtue of the regularities that are exhibited -that calls for 
an explanation, Foster appeals (in effect) to Dembski's 'explanatory fil-
ter': given that the regularities are both' specified' and sufficiently highly 
improbable, we cannot reasonably suppose that they are just a matter of 
chance. Second, in response to the observation that time-restricted laws 
would fit the data just as well as universal laws-and, hence, to the claim 
that we don't really have here a non-question-begging solution to "the 
problem of justifying inductive inferences" -Foster claims that, despite 
the apparent tension, rationality demands both rejection of unexplained 
regularities and rejection of capricious necessities. 
Despite the evident attraction that the proposal has for him, Foster 
finds one serious prima facie difficulty for the nomological-explanatory so-
lution to "the problem of justifying inductive inferences," namely, that it 
requires that the laws are both 'nomically' necessary and 'strictly' or 'logi-
cally' contingent. ("For any law [of nature], we surely have to acknowl-
edge that there are possible worlds in which that law does not obtain" (p. 
83).) I think that it is not nearly so obvious as Foster supposes that this is 
so. True enough, if we suppose that there are actually laws of nature, then 
there is no doubt that there are doxastically possible 'compositionally rel-
evant' worlds in which there are counter-instances to those laws: we can 
conceive of worlds in which those laws fail. But, unless we suppose that 
conceivability is a good guide to alethic possibility, it is hard to see why 
we should not suppose that the actual laws are all alethically necessary. 
[ndeed, if we do not suppose that conceivability is a good guide to alethic 
possibility, then it is hard to see why we should not suppose that the vari-
ous regularities that the laws are intended to explain are alethically nec-
essary. Since it isn't easy to explain why conceivability is a good guide to 
alethic possibility, I take it that there is a real difficulty here to which Foster 
gives insufficient attention. 
Foster considers, and dismisses, various naturalistic accounts of the 
modal standing of laws of nature. In particular, he very briefly considers 
the Shoemaker-Swoyer account of properties-according to which certain 
dispositions are essential to the identity of non-dispositional properties; 
he even more briefly considers Ellisian dispositional essentialism - ac-
cording to which laws of nature turn out to be strict necessities because 
basic natural kinds are constitutively dispositional in character; and, at 
somewhat greater length, he considers the suggestion that laws are "con-
crete entities that govern the world causally." I think that Foster's dismiss-
al of the first two alternatives is too swift: given the conclusions for which 
he aims, he ought to have given these proposals more extensive scrutiny. 
(Of course, that's not to say that he is-or that he is not-mistaken in the 
conclusions that he draws.) 
Foster also considers, and dismisses, various naturalistic attempts to 
account for the regularities at issue without adverting to natural laws. 
In particular, he considers: the suggestion that, for any given regularity, 
there is a lower-level regularity that explains why the given regularity 
obtains; the proposal that the relevant regularities are to be explained in 
terms of the dispositions of physical objects; and the suggestion that there 
might be some kind of naturalistic causal explanation of the obtaining of 
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these regularities. Against the first proposal, Foster claims that, even if 
specific regularities were all explained in terms of lower-level regulari-
ties, it would not follow that "the overall regularity of the world is self-ex-
planatory" (p. 114). No doubt this is so. Nothing can be self-explanatory: 
"A because A:' is always an explanatory solecism. But why shouldn't we 
think that, if there are regularities "all the way down," then there is no 
problem about "the justification of inductive inference"? Against the sec-
ond proposal, Foster objects that even if we can make sense of the notion 
of an autonomous disposition-i.e., of a disposition that does not depend 
upon an underlying law of nature-the existence of individual autono-
mous dispositions cannot explain collective regularities: we still have "no 
explanation of why different objects of the same intrinsic type have the 
same dispositions" (p. 115). And, against the third proposal, Foster claims 
that there is no way that any natural mechanism can causally dispose 
objects to behave in relevantly regular ways at different times, even if it is 
true that aspects of the structure of the world at a time can causally dis-
pose things to behave in the relevant regular ways at that time. 
In tl1e face of the foregoing discussion, Foster holds that the only live 
alternative is to suppose that the existence of the relevant explanations is 
to be explained in terms of the deeds of a supernatural (personal) agent. 
Foster takes it for granted-on the basis of his previous work-that some 
kind of Cartesian dualism is true, so that there is no conceptual difficulty 
in supposing that there are supernatural agents that can act directly on the 
physical world via their intentions. Moreover, Foster also assumes with-
out argument that freedom is properly given a libertarian analysis, and 
that human agents have libertarian freedom. He then sets himself the task 
of figuring out the properties of the supernatural (personal) agent correct-
ly invoked in the explanation of the relevant regularities, guided by the 
methodological precepts that one ought to avoid unnecessary complexity, 
and that one ought to minimise residual sources of puzzlement. 
According to Foster, it is most plausible to maintain-simply on the ba-
sis of the relevant regularities-that there is a single supernatural agent that 
caused the whole of the physical universe to exist, that is the creator of peo-
ple, and that is causally primitive. Moreover, he also argues that it is most 
plausible to suppose-again, on the basis of the relevant regularities-that 
there is no temporal limitation on the extent of the existence of this super-
natural agent; that any degreed attributes that are possessed by this super-
natural agent are possessed 'to the highest degree' -so that, in particular, 
this agent is perfectly rational, maximally knowledgeable and maximally 
powerful; and that this supernatural agent is perfectly good. (In order to 
get the last of these claims, Foster assumes-again without argument-that 
morality is objective and that moral claims are rationally overriding.) 
Faced with the objection that the conclusions that he draws conflict 
with the guiding precepts that he invokes, Foster observes that it is bound 
to be the case that there are questions that have no answers, unless one 
supposes that the terminus of explanation has some kind of necessity. 
Consequently, he countenances the suggestion that his supernatural agent 
is a necessary existent, while nonetheless insisting that it need not follow 
from this allowance that there is a successful ontological argument. Here, 
I think that there are serious questions to be raised. On Foster's account, 
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there are many different universes that God might have made: we are not 
to suppose that the existence of our universe is necessary. Furthermore, 
since God has libertarian freedom, there are possible worlds in which God 
makes those other universes. When we consider a particular regularity in 
our universe, the existence of that regularity is explained in terms of God's 
desire (or intention, or whatever) to make a universe in which that regu-
larity is instantiated. Moreover, when we compare our actual world with a 
world in which God makes a universe in which some other regularity ob-
tains, ex hypothesi, there is no explanation in either world of why God has 
the one set of desires (or intentions, or whatever) rather than the other. So, 
it seems, the naturalist is being asked to trade in (putatively) unexplained 
regularities in the universe for unexplainable desires (or intentions, or 
whatever) in God. I do not think that naturalists should accept this deal: 
if you really think that there must be a satisfying explanation for the hold-
ing of the regularities-one that does avoid unnecessary complexities and 
that minimizes residual sources of puzzlement-then you have very good 
reason to deny that Foster has found it. 
In the second last chapter of the book, Foster provides a defense of his 
causal account of laws, and in particular, of the view that God's creative 
activities should be viewed in terms of the imposition of regularities qua 
regularities that create laws, and not in terms of the direct creation of the 
physical universe in all of its details. In particular, Foster claims that if 
God creates the entire universe directly, then the only way that God can 
ensure the truth of individual counterfactuals-e.g., that this particular 
crystal glass would break if it were dropped-is by ensuring that had he 
decided to create the universe in a way that made the antecedent of this 
counterfactual true, then he would also have decided to create in a way 
that made its consequent true as well. But, according to Foster, this won't 
do, since "the only disposition involved is the one that characterises God, 
and this makes no difference ... to how things are with the glass" (p. 164). 
This argument strikes me as odd. Given that God has libertarian freedom, 
I don't see how God could ensure that had he decided to create the uni-
verse in a way that made the antecedent of this counterfactual true, then 
he would also have decided to create in a way that made its consequent 
true as well; but, in any case, no matter what God does, it surely can still 
be true that, in all of the nearest possible worlds in which the glass is 
dropped, it breaks-i.e., there is no reason at all to suppose that there 
is something more that God must do in order to ensure that the relevant 
counterfactual is true. 
In the last chapter, Foster tidies up some loose ends. He offers an ac-
count of 'probabilistic laws' -or, more exactly, of ersatz probabilistic 
laws-and defends the proposal that all laws should properly be under-
stood to include an exclusion clause: when God makes laws, these laws 
can always have the form of causing it to be the case that Fs are Gs except 
in cases in which God intervenes subsequently to make it the case that 
particular Fs are not Gs. Moreover, he claims that it is a 'safe assumption' 
that God would not create laws of this kind unless he intends "to leave 
the world to follow its law-ordained course in at least the vast majority 
of cases" (p. 181). Even if we accept this contention, we might wonder 
why we should suppose that God must ordain laws that are universal: 
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if God could ordain laws that are local to places and times, then we still 
don't have the promised "justification of inductive inferences." Here, in-
terestingly, Foster adverts to a 'noseeum' inference: it is hard to think of 
anything that might give God a reason to restrict the scope of laws, so it 
is reasonable to give some credence to the thought that there isn't any-
thing that might give God such a reason. Given his confidence about his 
"knowledge of the mind of God/' it is interesting to speculate about what 
Foster would say in response to evidential arguments from evil: it is, after 
alt hard to believe that regularities involving evil and brutality are com-
pelling evidence for the goodness of his postulated supernatural agent. 
Foster says no more than that the needed account would "make a long 
story" (p. 145). 
Overall, it seems to me that this book has similar virtues (and draw-
backs) to work that Foster-and Howard Robinson, to whom the book is 
dedicated - have done on other topics. On the one hand, Foster's critiques 
of particular naturalistic theories are typically penetrating, and executed 
with considerable skill: consider, again, his critique of Armstrong's theory 
of laws in the present work. On the other hand, because the major step 
in the argument for his preferred theistic alternative is simply that the 
naturalistic theories that he has examined are all defective in one way or 
another, there are various ways in which that argument is weak. First-as 
I noted in my earlier remarks about God's creative desires (or intentions, 
or whatever)-there is the worry that when Foster's theories are examined 
by the same stringent criteria that are applied to the competing natural-
istic theories, it will be pretty clear that they do no better in withstanding 
critical scrutiny. If we are to take a ride in the critical taxicab, we have no 
option but to ride it all the way to its destination: once there, it is almost 
inevitable that we shall reach the view that any theory that people have 
formulated thus far is capable of improvement in important respects; the 
more so if we set the bar for the assessment of theories sufficiently high. 
Second, it is clear that those who suppose that there are plenty of good, 
independent reasons to prefer naturalism to theism needn't be especially 
disheartened by telling criticisms of particular naturalistic theories: there 
are naturalistic theories that Foster dismisses without due consideration; 
and, of course, there are naturalistic theories-including hitherto unfor-
mulated naturalistic theories-that he fails to consider at all. 
